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NOTES

child, we submit that the interests of the child should be paramount, even
though in extreme cases the neglect of the child is involuntary.
Summary of Suggested Statutory Changes
In the light of the foregoing, it is suggested that the following changes
be made in the Wyoming Statutes relating to the adoption of abandoned
children:
(1) That a statutory definition of what constitutes abandonment be
formulated which pertains to all children under 18 years of age, and includes in particular the specification of a minimum period of time beyond
which so-called "temporary" abandonment be presumed to be permanentin order to give the court some encouragement to make a finding of
abandonment, and to protect such a finding from the reappearance of
parents who suddenly develop the whim to reclaim their children.
(2) That a special proceeding leading to a decree or finding of
abandonment or termination of parental rights, based upon notice to
parents, and including a hearing, te established.
(3) That Sections 58-206 and 58-207 be amended so as not to apply to:
(a) Adoptions based on abandonments judically ascertained in
proceedings outlined in (2) above, or
(b) Adoptions in which existing statutes authorize organizations and persons other than parents to consent to the
adoption in loco parentis.
(4) That the statutes pertaining to the adoption of orphan children
(particularly 58-213 and 58-609[4]) be harmonized and made uniform.
(5) That the words "deserted" in 58-113 and 58-501 be changed to
"abandoned", and that the references to abandonment in all existing
Statutes be made uniform (e.g., "entirely abandoned" in 59-11K "abandoned
children, whose parentage is unknown" in 58-609 [4], "abandoning their
children, without providing for their support and education" in 58-213).
(6) That the conflict in the definitions of dependent children-at
least so far as abandoned children are concerned-set out in 58-606 and
25-101 be resolved.
(7) That there be a declaration of legislative policy to the effect that
in an adoption proceeding, the welfare of the child shall be the primary
consideration, with consent of the parents as secondary.
ARTHUR F. FISHER
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The scope of this article is restricted to a discussion of the civil enforcement of the obligation of parents to support their children when the defaulting parent is still residing in the state of Wyoming or at least has
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attachable property therein. The enforcement of the same civil liability
of a defaulting parent who is residing outside the state is discussed in
another article in this issue dealing with the Uniform Enforcement of
Support Act. Before discussing legislation dealing with the enforcement
of the parental duty of support, it is necessary to determine the nature of
the duty, the history of its enforcement, and the legislative background of
our statutes dealing with the nonsupport problem in our own state.
The duty of a parent to support his children was well recognized at
common law. The duty, as Blackstone described it, is a "principle of
natural law; an obligation, says Puffendorf, laid on them not only by
nature herself, but by their own proper act in bringing them into the
world."' Such a duty, it would seem, would be deemed sacrosanct, and
any deviation from it would warrant strong punitive measures, or at least
would command reinforcement of that duty by way of civil enforcement.
Instead, the courts of equity refused to enforce this duty and held it to be
a mere moral obligation, independent of statutory enactment.2 The
rather specious rationale of this non-enforcement of the duty seems to be
that performance of the duty was better left to the impulses of nature since
it was secured by the strength of natural affection and thereby made human
laws unnecessary.3 As one would suspect, this type of reasoning completely
excluded any possibility of there being any legal means by which a natural
father might be compelled to support his illegitimate child, since such a
4
child was said to be filius nullius, i.e. the son of nobody.
Some early American courts adopted this rather harsh common law
conception of a parent's duty to support his children. 5 Fortunately, most
later American courts adopted the view that the duty to-support was not
only moral but was also an enforceable, legal obligation.6 This changed
conception of the parental duty to support children has given rise to
several important consequences concerning (1) the defaulting parent's
liability to third persons supplying necessaries for the maintenance of the
children, (2) the children's right to sue for support and maintenance and
(3) the mother's right to sue for necessaries furnished out of her own
separate estate and for the future support and maintenance of the children.
Since the parent's
held that a deliquent
by a third person to
parent and the third
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

obligation to his children is legal, it is now generally
parent is liable to pay for the necessaries furnished
the minor child without any contract between the
person or any consent on the part of the parent. 7

1 BI. Comm. 447.
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Kelly v. Davis, 49 N.H. 187, 6 Am. Rep. 499 (1870).
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435 (Ala .1837).
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The liability is based on either (1) an agency theory or (2) quasi-contract
theory. Under the agency theory, the parent's neglect to perform his legal
duty implies an authority to bind the parent, i.e. the third person acts as
the parent's agent.8 Under the quasi-contract theory, the third person, in
supplying necessaries, is considered as having conferred a benefit upon
the parent because he is fulfilling the parent's duty of support. In conferring this benefit, there arises an implied-in-law contract between the
parent and the third person to pay for these necessaries in order to prevent
unjust enrichment of the parent. 9
As to an infant's right to enforce the parental obligation to support
him, there is a split of authority. In those jurisdictions which do not permit an infant to enforce this right in equity, the basis of this incapacity to
sue is the common law concept that the parent is only under a moral
obligation to support his children.' 0 These jurisdictions adhere to the
rationale that such a bill in equity would disrupt family unity and harmony
and also sweep away parental discipline." However, in other jurisdictions
which have permitted the infant to assert his right to support, the established principle is followed that "where a duty exists equity will provide
a remedy for its violation."' 2 The rationale of these decisions seems to be
(1) that the parental obligation to support is legal; 13 (2) that in nonsupport cases the family relationship usually has already been dissolved
or disturbed and its harmony shattered by the action of the father, i.e. there
was no family life to be preserved; 14 and (3) that criminal liability is not
adequate for the child since it "does not clothe body nor satiate the pangs
of hunger."' 15
It is now generally held that a mother can recover from the father the
amount which she has expended from her personal estate for the necessary
support of herself and her chlidren.'8 This is also true in the case of the
divorced mother where the divorce decree has made no provision for the
support of the children, 17 even though the divorce may have been due to
her fault.' 8 The rationale is that the father's duty of support is independetn of the parents' marital status.' 9 An action in this situation would not
have been possible at common law since a married woman could not sue
her husband and did not own separate property. Today these legal
disabilities have been removed by the Married Women's Acts permitting a
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
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of minors. One theory is based on agency principles.
the wife has implied authority to purchase necessaries. While doing so,
she is acting as her husband's agent in performing his duty of supporting
his minor children. The third person, in so dealing with the mother, is

in reality dealing with the husband. The wife, as her husband's agent, has
a direct cause of action against her husband on a contract made in his
behalf. 21 The second theory of the wife's recovery is a "quasi-contract"
theory. This theory provides that when a third person supplies necessaries,
he confers a benefit on the husband. As a result, there arises an implied
contract between the husband and third person. If the wife pays the
husband's debt to the third person, she becomes subrogated to the cause
of action which the third person had against the husband. This theory
22
is sometimes referred to as the subrogation doctrine.
The mother's right to enforce the father's duty to provide for future
support of his children is a topic which is to be discussed at a later point
in the article in connection with the parent's civil liability for nonsupport
in Wyoming.
There are other illustrations of the present day trend towards enforcing the parents' duty to support. In the case of illegitimate children, many
American courts have held that the father is under no obligation to support
such children in the absence of statute.2 3 However, one state court has
broken with this common law precedent and has held that the father of
an illegitimate child is under an enforceable nonstatutory duty to support
that child.24 Because of the older judicial decisions, many states have
imposed a statuory duty on. the father to support his illegitimate child.
This has usually been done by (I) making specific references to illegitimate
children in the nonsupport statute, by (2) legitimization statutes, or (3)
by adoption of the Uniform Illegitimacy Law, as Wyoming has done. In
the case of an infant who has his own separate estate, it has been held that
a father is bound to support such infant if he be of ability to do so and
25
no allowance will be made for that purpose out of the infant's property.
In case of bankruptcy, it has been held that a father was not relieved by his
discharge in bankruptcy from his liability stemming from an agreement
to pay his divorced wife a certain annual sum for the support of his children
during their minority.26 In the case of emancipation of a child due to the
cruelty of a parent, it has been held that the parent is not relieved of his
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See note 16 supra.
Sodowsky v. Sodowsky, 511, Okl. 689, 152 Pac. 390 (1915) ; 26 Temp. L.Q. 459 (1953).
26 Temp. L.Q. 459 (1953); Adler v. Adler, 171 Pa. Super. 508, 90 A.2d 389 (1952).
See note 4 supra.
Daughty v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 Pac. 619 (1923).
National Valley Bank v. Hancock, 100 Va. 101, 40 S.E. 611 (1902).
See note 6 supra.
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liability for the child's burial services, even though he has no rights to the
son's earnings.2 7 One of the most extreme examples of how far the parental
obligation of support has been extended is afforded by a New York case,
Betz v. Horr.28 In this case, the natural parent of the child was compelled
to provide for his children when the adopting parent was unable to do so,
even though a New York statute relieved the natural parent of all his
parental duties to the child upon adoption. The court said that the
legislature, in passing this statute, did not intend that the natural parent
could shed his liabilities to such an extent that he could shift the burden
of support to the state when the child was about to become a public charge.
The effect of the decision was to make the adopting parent primarily
liable for the support of the child and the natural parent secondarily liable
for the same support.
As one can determine from the preceding discussion, there has been a
growing concern on the part of the courts with the problem of nonsupport
of children; and accordingly, the courts have become increasingly more
humane and practical in the treatment of this serious problem. Legislatures,
too, have responded to the growing problem by passing statutes which have
not only defined the legal duty of the parent to support, but have also
provided criminal and civil remedies against the defaulting parent. Thus,
the courts' efforts to cope with this problem have been implemented by
these statutes.
Early nonsupport legislation seemed to be actuated by a desire to
relieve social and public institutions of the burden of maintaining abandoned or indigent children who cannot be supported by their mother. For
example, it was sometimes provided that if the child is about to become a
public charge, the state will place the burden of support upon the family
and relatives rather than upon the state.2 9 Wyoming's first statute covering
civil liability for nonsupport is an example of legislation embodying this
particular philosophy. This statute, Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 58-215
(unamended), provides that if any person having the legal charge of a
child, abandons such child so that he "shall become a charge upon the
county", the absconding person shall become liable to a civil action by the
board of county commissioners for support given to the child by the county.
Upon some consideration, it can be observed that this type of legislation leaves something to be desired. That "something" is a civil remedy
which enables the mother, relative or other third person who is caring for
the abandoned child to enforce the delinquent parent's duty of support.
Such a civil remedy has riot been neglected by the states. Many states have
enacted various and diverse laws providing civil relief for persons caring
for an abandoned child. Several typical examples of such legislation are
27.
28.
29.

Huneycutt and Co. v. Thompson, 159 N. Car. 29, 74 S.E. 628 (1920).
20 N.Y.S. 500 (1936).
Ibid.
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the Uniform Support of Dependents Act, the Uniform Illegitimacy Law,
and the Uniform Enforcement of Support Act.
In light of this legisltaive and judicial background, what has Wyoming
done to enforce the parent's duty of support?
30
providing for civil
(1) In 1879, the legislature passed a statute
liability in desertion cases. This is the same statute as just referred to.
3l
(2) In 1882, the legislature passed a statute empowering the court
to grant a support order as in divorce, upon the petition of the
wife when both spouses are separated or living together and the
husband refuses to support the wife and children or either.
(3) In 1915, Wyoming adopted the Uniform Desertion and Nonsupport Act 3 2 which provides a criminal remedy against a delinquent husband who deserts and wilfully fails to support his
child. The Act also provides that the court in its discretion
shall make an order for payment of support to the wife in lieu
of the criminal penalty. This Act applies only to fathers still
in the state.
(4) In 1929, the Uniform Illegitimacy Law, 33 providing for support
of an illegitimate child, was passed.
(5) In 1949, a statute was amended3 4 so as to enable the courts to
order parents of children committed to the State Children's Home
to pay toward the care and support of such children.
It can be readily seen that up to 1950, Wyoming had recognized and
responded to the compelling need for child support. Wyoming, as have all
other states, has also participated in the Aid to Dependent Children program which is jointly financed by state and federal funds. The purpose
of this program is to give a decent standard of living to those children
that are deprived of support due to the death of a parent, or parent's
35
absence from the home, or the parent's mental ro physical incapacity.
At the end of 1952, the monthly average of ADC cases handled by county
welfare departments in Wyoming was 531.36

March, 1952, it was found
months, 45% of those cases
This 45% represented over
37
expended.
These statistics point

In both January, 1950, and

that out of 556 cases handled in each of these
were due to divorces, separations and desertions.
$600,000 in a biennium of public welfare money
out the need for more vigorous and effective

86.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 58-215 (unamended).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 3-5919.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 9-803 to 9-808.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, secs. 58-401 to 58-425.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 19-202.
Report of Wyoming Taxpayers Association, Jan. 1953: "Aid to Dependent Children
in Wyoming."
Ibid.

37.

Ibid.

30.
31.
32.
33.
4.
35.

Noams
measures for enforcement of the parental obligation to support minor
children. To further meet this challenging problem of support, the Wyoming legislature, in 1951, passed the Uniform Enforcement of Support Act
to deal with the problem of the delinquent parent who removes himself
to another state. However, there was left the problem of enforcing the
parental obligation within the state. The old statute38 dealing with civil
liability for desertion was inadequate for this purpose.- This is probably
due to the great reluctance on the part of the county attorneys, who are
not full-time officials, to assume the added burden of enforcement of the
duty to support under this Act. This is particularly understandable in
view of the many other duties imposed upon them by various statutes.
In view of the ineffectiveness of the statute in question, the Wyoming
Youth Council, during 1952, recommended the passage of an amendment
to this old nonsupport statute in order to provide for more effective enforcement of the parental duty of support in desertion cases. 3 9 This
amendment was substantially similar to another proposal which passed
the state house of representatives unanimously in 1951, but died in the
senate committee. In 1953, this recommended amendment was finally
approved and passed by the state legislature in substantially the same form
it was presented. This amendment now provides the basis of enforcement
of the parental duty to support where the defaulting parent still resides
in the estate or has attachable assets in the same. Let us now examine some
of the provisions of this statute, as amended.
Paragraph (1) provides that any person legally responsible for the
support of a child under 18 years shall be liable in a civil action if he
"abandons, deserts, neglects or unjustifiably fails to support" the child.
It also provides that "it shall be no defense that such child was not or is not
8n destitute circumstances." (Italics ours.)
This latter provision is an
attempt to avoid the doctrine of State v. Haworth, 66 Wyo. 238, 208 P.2d 279
(1949). The court in that case determined that proof of a child's destitution was indispensable to conviction for desertion under Wyo. Comp. Stat.,
1945, sec. 9-803, which makes it a crime for the parent to refuse to provide
for the support of "his or her children under the age of sixteen years in
destitute or necessitous circumstances." (Italics ours.) This holding has
the necessary result of rendering the parental obligation of support unenforceable in most cases, where the child is being cared for by the other
parent, a charitable instiitution or other third person. As one court has
aptly put it, "we would have this anomaly: A defendant, whose family,
because of his violation of a penal statute, is being sheltered, fed, and
clothed by sympathetic friends or charitable institutions, interposing this
same charity as a shield to protect himself from the penalties which the
law imposes for the violation of the statute under which he is prosecuted." 40
38.
39.
40.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 58-215 (unamended).
Biennial Report of the Wyoming Youth Council (Nov. 1952).
State v. Bess, 44 Utah 39, 137 Pac.829 (1913).
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In short, this decision defeats the very purpose of the statute, i.e to compel
the parent to support his children through fear of criminal punishment if
he defaults.
This Haworth case follows that line of decisions which adhere to the
old "public charge" theory which has been previously mentioned. 41 This
theory holds that the primary purpose of these criminal nonsupport
statutes is to relieve the public of the necessity of supporting the wives
and children of husbands who are able but neglect or refuse to do so. In
short, the purpose is to protect the state against pauperism. As one court
said, "so long as children are properly cared for, the state is not interested
42
as to the source from whence the supplies come."1
It is surprising that the Wyoming Supreme Court construed the criminal nonsupport statute in this way. There is an abundance of authority
which has construed the same or similar statutes realting to criminal nonsupport so as to render nugatory any defense which asserts that the child's
wants ae supplied by the geneyosity of thixd pesons."
The theory
underlying these latter decisions is that the statutes were not only intended
to protect the state against public charges but also to provide support
44
directly to the neglected wife and childen.
Proceeding to paragraph (2) of sec. 58-215 as amended, we find that
the benefits of this Act extend not only to the parent furnishing support
but also to any person, agency or institution furnishing support to the
neglected child. In other words, any of these parties can maintain an action
for support under this section. This paragraph further provides that if
the child is wholly or partially supported by public welfare funds, and if
private counsel is not otherwise available, the judge of the district court,
upon the written request of the county welfare director, can direct the
county attorney to file a petition and maintain this action. The effect of
this latter provision throws the burden of civil enforcement of the duty to
support primarily on private counsel, and very narrowly confines the duty
of the county attorney to maintain this proceeding to those cases of actual
destitution, e.g. ADC cases. This provision was adopted to meet the
strenuous objection of the Wyoming County Attorney's Association against
further enlarging the county attorney's already onerous burden of law
enforcement with additional duties. 4"
A more important effect is the probability of procuring more vigorous
enforcement of the duty to support, and hence a greater degree of relief
to the supporting parent and welfare agencies in cases of destitution. This
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Dalton v. State, 118 Ga. 196, 44 S.E. 977 (1903); State v. Thorton, 232 Mo. 298,
134 S.W. 519 (1911).
State v. Thorton, 23 Mo. 298, 134 S.W. 519 (1911).
State v. Bess, 44 Utah 39, 137 Pac. 829 (1913); State v. Waller, 90 Kan. 829, 136
Pac. 215 (1913).
State v. Moran, 99 Conn. 115, 121 A. 277 (1923).
See note 39 supra.
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provision also meets the criticism of those who contend that public welfare
legislation smacks too much of socialism, in that the state and not individuals shoulders too much of the burden of mitigating the needs of the
indigent and helpless. As to that rather limited number of cases where
the child has become a public charge and private counsel is unavailable,
it might be pointed out that the county attorney is already charged with
the duty of giving free legal counsel to the party instituting the action. This
provision is of particular benefit to those indigent people who are not able
to wholly or even partially support the children in their custody. Thus,
these people are not deprived of this statutory remedy because they are
unable to procure counsel by virtue of their impecunious circumstances.
Paragraph (3) of the 1953 amendment provides that the action for
support shall be brought in the district court of the county wherein the
defendent resides, or may be found, or has attachable property.
Paragraph (4) provides for attachment proceedings to secure the
plaintiff's judgment and to enable the plaintiff to maintain an action
under this statute where the delinquent parent has either removed himself
from the state or cannot be found. These are excellent provisions. This
paragraph has even more significance when one considers the state Welfare
Department's finding, in 1950, that the delinquent parent was out of state
or his whereabout unknown in about 70% of the ADC cases which were
due to desertion, separation or divorce. 46 The attachment proceedings,
under paragraph (4), are to be in conformity with Article 50, Chapter 3,
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, as amended. This means that paragraph (4) adds
a new ground for attachment to Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, Sec. 3-5001. This
ground, as stated by this paragraph, is "that the defendant has abandoned,
deserted, wilfully neglected, or without just cause failed to provide for the
support maintenance and education of a child under the age of 18 years
for whose support he is legally responsible."
It should be pointed out that an undertaking is required to be executed
by the plaintiff in accordance with Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 3-5003.
What about an undertaking in those actions which the county attorney
institutes on behalf of the parties who are unable to procure private
counsel? Does the county attorney have to execute an undertaking? Under
sec. 58-215, prior to the amendment, the undertaking was dispensed with
in the attachment proceedings provided therein, but under this old statute
this action was instituted by the board of county commissioners through the
county attorney. The situation under the new statute is entirely different
since, as mentioned before, the action is commenced by the county attorney
on behalf of a destitute person who is the real party in interest and to whom
the county attorney gives legal counsel. Therefore, it is not the county
attorney who must execute the undertaking but the real party in interest,
i.e. the destitute person seeking the relief money.
46.

See note 35 supra.
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But, having arrived at this conclusion, we are confronted with the
problem of how a person of destitute circumstances will be able to execute,
by sufficient surety, an undertaking "in the sum equal to double the
amount of the plaintiff's claim." 47 In the typical case, it would be difficult for such a plaintiff to find persons who would be willing to serve as
surety to such an undertaing. It is submitted that the legislature did not
give this phase of the problem adequate consideration.
Continuing on to paragraph (5) of sec. 58-215 as amended, we learn
that (1) the measure of the plaintiff's recovery shall be the "reasonable
value" of the support furnished to the child by the plaintiff; that (2) the
court, in addition, may make other suitable order for the future care and
support of the child. Referring now to the first provision, what would be
the "reasonable value" of the support furnished? Does this "reasonable
value" refer to the reasonable value of all the necessaries provided to the
child? Or, does it refer to the reasonable value of the delinquent parent's
share of support which he should have contributed to the welfare of his
child, but instead was furnished by the petitioner? It would seem upon a
literal reading of this provision, that the former construction is intended.
However, we encounter some difficulty in reconciling this construction
with the Wyoming Supreme Court's dictum in State v. Haworth (supra)
to the effect that parents of a child are under the same legal duty to support
him; that in determining the amount the delinquent parent should contribute for support, "the proper inquiry is as to the child's need and the
ability of each parent to furnish means for its support." This dictum
would certainly support the second construction of the provision under
discussion, since one parent is not entirely responsible for all necessaries
furnished to the child if the other parent is able to contribute to the child's
support.
Let us now examine the second provision mentioned in paragraph (5)
of sec. 58-215. This provision is rather unique among state statutes similar
to sec. 58-215 in that it authorizes the court to make orders relating to the
future support of the child. Its validity is amply supported by precedent
in analogous situations. For example, a common situation in which the
court can make an order for future support is in the case of divorce. Wyo.
Comp. Stat. 1945, Sec. 3-5915 authorizes the court granting a divorce to
make provision for the children's "present comfort and future wellbeing."
Another situation where future support has been ordered by the courts is
the one presented in those cases in which the divorced wife brings an
action in equity against her ex-husband to compel him to pay future sup48
port, not previously provided for in the divorce decree.
There is also the precedent of Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 73 P.2d
953 (1937). Here the husband and wife who were living apart had one
47.
48.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec .3-5003.
Geary v. Geary, 102 Neb. 511, 167 N.W. 778 (1918).
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child whom (along with the wife) the husband refused to support, even
though he was able to. The wife instituted a divorce proceeding in which
she prayed for support money and custody of the child. The district court
refused the divorce but retained the case in order to dispose of matters
relating to the child. The court eventually awarded the custody of the
child to the wife and ordered the father to pay $10 per month for the
child's support. The Supreme Court, in upholding this action of the
district court ,held that the lower court had the powers of a court of equity
to determine the custody of the child; and that it also had jurisdiction, by
virtue of Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec. 3-5919 (supra), to entertain a proceeding by a wife to compel the husband to support the minor child when
both husband and wife are separated. Here is a case where our Supreme
Court approved an order for future support even though both spouses
were still married. The situation embraced by sec. 3-5919 is very much
akin to that covered by sec. 58-215. In the former, the husband has refused
to support his wife and children when both spouses are separated. In the
latter, the husband refuses to support his wife and children after he has
deserted them. In both cases, the husband is living apart from his wife
and children and refuses to support them. If the situation covered by
sec. 3-5919 can be remedied by an order for future support, it would seem
that, in light of Urbach v.Urbach, the situation covered by sec. 58-215 can
also be remedied in the same manner.
In conclusion, sec. 58-215 represents the most recent attempt by the
Wyoming legislature to effectively cope with the problem of an everincreasing number of ADC cases, and the other problem of providing those
who care for the chlidren with an effective means of relieving themselves,
to some extent, of the burden of support. This is in harmony with the
current trend of assisting the supporting parent or third person with a
means of reducing their burden of support. The trend, standing in sharp
contrast with the reluctance of the old common law courts to enforce the
parental duty of support, is indicative of the new responses of the legislatures
and cburts to changing social conditions. In making such responses, legislatures and courts have given new meaning and vitality to the statement of
Justice Holmes that "the life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience."
JAMES ROBERT MOTHERSHEAD

THE UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT
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"Mary Doe consulted me today", the lawyer's memorandum read, "and
told me the following story: Mrs. Doe said she was married and the mother
of'three children, Jimmy 7, Johnny 5, and Susie 1. Her husband, John,
lived with the family here in Sagebrush, Wyoming, until a few months ago,
when he left unexpectedly. Although he had a good job with the Buildem

